Energy Security — Chokepoints, Strategic

All chokepoints

The 8 critical energy chokepoints — complete reference table

A chokepoint is a narrow passage through which energy trade must flow. Every major chokepoint is documented below with GPS coordinates, daily throughput, the energy flows at risk, and what happens when it closes. Data from US EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (2024) and IEA.

All daily throughput figures are approximate annual averages. Source: US EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints 2024 · IEA
Chokepoint	GPS (centre)	Daily throughput	Width (narrowest)	Primary energy flows	Alternative if blocked
Strait of Hormuz	26.56°N 56.25°E	21 M bbl/day oil · 4 Tcf/yr LNG	~33 km navigable	Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran exports to Asia, Europe, USA	Saudi East-West pipeline (5 M bbl/day), UAE Fujairah bypass (1.5 M). Only ~30% of Hormuz volume can bypass. Risk: CRITICAL.
Strait of Malacca	1.25°N 103.82°E	16 M bbl/day oil · LNG	~2.7 km (Phillips Channel)	Middle East oil to China (80% of China's oil imports), Japan, South Korea, India	Sunda Strait (Indonesia), Lombok Strait — both add 3–5 days to voyage. Risk: CRITICAL.
Suez Canal	30.42°N 32.35°E	4.5 M bbl/day oil · LNG	24–31 m draught	Europe-Asia oil trade, Russia oil, LNG from Qatar/USA to Europe, North African crude north	Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) — adds ~6,000 nautical miles, 7–10 extra days, +$300,000/voyage. Risk: CRITICAL (proved 2021 Ever Given).
Bab-el-Mandeb	12.58°N 43.47°E	4.8 M bbl/day oil	~29 km	Red Sea-Indian Ocean junction. Gulf oil to Europe via Suez. LNG from Qatar to Europe.	Cape of Good Hope — same as Suez diversion. Risk: HIGH (Houthi attacks 2023–2025 significantly disrupted traffic).
Turkish Straits (Bosphorus)	41.11°N 29.03°E	2.4 M bbl/day oil	700 m (narrowest)	Russian Black Sea crude north to south (Caspian/Russian oil to Mediterranean markets)	Overland pipeline only. Turkey controls access — blocked Russian tankers briefly 2022. Risk: HIGH.
Danish Straits	55.61°N 10.56°E	~3 M bbl/day oil + LNG	Multiple straits	Baltic Sea oil exports (Russia Primorsk, Ust-Luga) and LNG. Denmark, Norway, Sweden oil trade.	Limited alternatives — Baltic is semi-enclosed. Risk: MEDIUM.
Panama Canal	9.08°N 79.68°W	~1 M bbl/day oil + LNG	Post-Panamax locks 49m wide	US LNG to Asia (Sabine Pass to Japan/Korea), US Gulf oil to Pacific Asia, coal to Asia	Cape Horn (South America, add 8,000 nm) or Panama land transfer. 2023 drought reduced capacity 30%. Risk: MEDIUM.
Strait of Dover / English Channel	51.05°N 1.55°E	Busiest lane globally — ~500 ships/day	33 km	North Sea oil south, Netherlands-UK LNG, European coal and gas imports from west. All Atlantic-North Sea trade.	Around Scotland (add ~1,000 nm). Risk: LOW for closure, HIGH for density of traffic incidents.

GPS: 26.56°N 56.25°E · Iran / Oman

Strait of Hormuz — The world's most critical oil chokepoint

The Hormuz numbers

26.56°N 56.25°E · Iran (north) / Oman (south)

Daily oil throughput: approximately 21 million barrels — about 20% of all global oil traded, and nearly 30% of global LNG trade. The strait is only 33 km wide at its navigable channels — ships follow two 3.2 km lanes (one inbound, one outbound) separated by a 3.2 km buffer zone. Every VLCC tanker leaving Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar must pass through this 33-km gap.

Countries dependent on Hormuz: India (~85% of oil imports), China (~80%), Japan (~87%), South Korea (~87%), European countries (varying). The USA no longer depends heavily on Hormuz since the shale revolution — but close US allies do.

Source: US EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints 2024

What happens if Hormuz is blocked

Scenario analysis · US EIA 2024

Saudi East-West Pipeline: The Petroline (East-West Crude Oil Pipeline) runs 1,200 km across Saudi Arabia from Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea (26.08°N 48.28°E → 24.09°N 38.07°E). Capacity: approximately 5 million bbl/day. This provides partial bypass for Saudi crude — but only for Saudi Arabia, not UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, or Qatar.

Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP): Runs from Habshan (23.84°N 53.67°E) to Fujairah (25.12°N 56.36°E) on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz. Capacity: 1.5 million bbl/day — about 7% of Hormuz throughput.

Net bypass capacity: approximately 6.5 million bbl/day out of 21 million — meaning approximately 14.5 million bbl/day has no alternative. A Hormuz closure would be the most severe energy supply disruption since the 1973 oil embargo, causing oil prices to spike above $200/bbl within days by most analyst estimates.

Hormuz tensions — documented incidents

Hormuz has been the scene of multiple serious incidents: the 1987–1988 Tanker War (during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran attacked 190 ships and the US Navy convoyed Kuwaiti tankers); the 2019 tanker seizures (Iran seized multiple vessels and shot down a US drone); 2023–2024 Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea (Bab-el-Mandeb) forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. The insurance cost for transiting the Red Sea/Hormuz zone rose by approximately 400% in 2024. Iran has repeatedly threatened to "close Hormuz" during diplomatic confrontations — though analysts note that Iran itself exports oil through the strait and would be harmed by closure. Source: US EIA · Lloyd's of London shipping data.

GPS: 1.25°N 103.82°E · Indonesia / Malaysia / Singapore

Strait of Malacca — Asia's energy lifeline

The Malacca numbers

1.25°N 103.82°E · narrowest at Phillips Channel 2.7 km

Daily throughput: approximately 16 million barrels of oil plus substantial LNG volumes. The Malacca Strait connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea — it is the only short sea route between the Middle East and East Asia. Ships come from the Persian Gulf, Africa, and the Americas and must pass through this 805 km long, 2.7 km wide passage to reach China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Malacca Dilemma: China coined this term to describe its strategic vulnerability. Approximately 80% of China's oil imports pass through Malacca. A blockade would cripple China's energy supply within weeks. This is why China is building pipelines and ports across Myanmar, Pakistan (CPEC), and developing the Kra Canal concept in Thailand.

Depth limitation: Maximum draught approximately 25 metres. This means the world's largest VLCCs and ULCCs cannot transit — they must use the deeper Lombok or Sunda Straits (adding 2–3 extra days).

Singapore — the chokepoint city

1.29°N 103.85°E

Singapore sits at the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and has built its entire economy partly around this geographic reality. Port of Singapore is the world's second-largest container port and the world's largest bunker fuel supplier (ship fuel) — refuelling approximately 130,000 vessels per year. Singapore's Pulau Bukom refinery (1.26°N 103.74°E) processes approximately 500,000 bbl/day for regional distribution. The Singapore Strait averages 80,000+ ship transits per year — approximately 230 per day. Piracy in the Malacca Strait peaked in the early 2000s (approximately 220 incidents in 2000) and was dramatically reduced by coordinated Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean naval patrols to near zero by 2020. Source: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).

GPS: 30.42°N 32.35°E · Egypt

Suez Canal — The Europe-Asia energy shortcut

The Suez Canal numbers and Ever Given incident (23 March 2021)

30.42°N 32.35°E · Egypt · 193 km length

The Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean Sea (Port Said, 31.26°N 32.30°E) to the Red Sea (Port Suez, 29.97°N 32.55°E). Length: 193 km. No locks required (sea levels equal). The canal handles approximately 4.5 million barrels of oil per day plus a growing proportion of global LNG trade. Approximately 12–13% of world trade by value transits Suez annually — approximately 20,000 ships per year.

The Ever Given blockage (23 March–29 March 2021): A 400-metre container ship ran aground in the canal, blocking it completely for 6 days. During those 6 days, approximately 369 ships backed up, estimated $9.6 billion/day of global trade was delayed, and approximately 12% of global trade was disrupted. Oil prices rose approximately $6/bbl. The incident proved that the canal's vulnerability is real — a single vessel can close it. The incident led to the Suez Canal Authority widening the canal's second lane and strengthening towboat capacity.

Sumed Pipeline bypass: The Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) Pipeline runs from Ain Sokhna (29.60°N 32.33°E) to Sidi Krir near Alexandria (31.12°N 29.71°E) — 320 km, capacity 2.4 million bbl/day. This provides partial oil bypass but not LNG.

Source: Suez Canal Authority · US EIA · Lloyd's Intelligence · UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport

Other critical chokepoints

Bab-el-Mandeb, Turkish Straits, and Panama Canal

Bab-el-Mandeb

12.58°N 43.47°E · Djibouti / Yemen / Eritrea

29 km wide at narrowest. Approximately 4.8 million bbl/day. Connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean — the southern end of the Suez Canal route. Any ship going from Middle East to Europe via Suez must pass through both Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. Houthi crisis (2023–2025): Houthi rebels based in Yemen launched drone and missile attacks on commercial vessels transiting the strait — forcing most major shipping lines to divert around the Cape of Good Hope. Insurance premiums for the Red Sea route rose 400%. Suez Canal revenue fell ~$7 billion in 2024. UK/US military operations targeted Houthi launch sites. Source: US EIA · Lloyd's List.

Turkish Straits (Bosphorus + Dardanelles)

41.11°N 29.03°E (Bosphorus) · Turkey

The Bosphorus (narrows to 700 metres) and Dardanelles are the only outlet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Approximately 2.4 million bbl/day — predominantly Russian crude from Novorossiysk (44.73°N 37.77°E) and Ceyhan (36.65°N 35.77°E, BTC pipeline terminus). Turkey governs access under the 1936 Montreux Convention. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine (2022), Turkey exercised its right to block warships from non-Black Sea nations while allowing civilian commercial traffic (including Russian oil tankers) to continue. This became diplomatically contentious when Western allies sought to restrict Russian oil exports. Turkey also restricted access for vessels not carrying proof of insurance meeting P&I Club requirements. Source: Montreux Convention · Turkish Straits Historical Society.

Panama Canal

9.08°N 79.68°W · Panama

80 km connecting Pacific and Atlantic. Post-Panamax locks (49m wide) opened 2016 allowing Q-Flex LNG carriers to transit. Critical for US LNG exports from Sabine Pass (29.73°N 93.87°W) to Japan and South Korea. Also carries coal from Colombia to Asia. 2023 drought: The canal relies on Gatun Lake (9.25°N 79.91°E) for freshwater locks — the 2023 El Niño drought dropped lake levels to historic lows, forcing the Canal Authority to reduce transits by 30% and cut ship draughts. Backlog of 150+ ships. LNG vessels were prioritised, coal and bulk carriers waited weeks. Global coal and LNG prices spiked. Source: Panama Canal Authority · IHS Markit shipping data.

Strategic reserves

Strategic Petroleum Reserves — the chokepoint insurance policy

Strategic reserves are stockpiles of oil held by governments specifically to release during supply emergencies — chokepoint closures, geopolitical disruptions, or sudden demand spikes. The IEA requires member countries to maintain 90 days of net import coverage in emergency stocks. The US SPR and India's ISR are the two most relevant to major consuming nations.

USA — Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)

Multiple salt caverns · Louisiana and Texas

The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is the world's largest government-owned oil stockpile. Stored in 60 underground salt caverns along the US Gulf Coast at four sites: Bryan Mound (28.96°N 95.82°W, Texas), Big Hill (29.89°N 94.13°W, Texas), West Hackberry (30.05°N 93.29°W, Louisiana), and Bayou Choctaw (30.61°N 91.27°W, Louisiana). Total capacity: approximately 714 million barrels. Current holdings: approximately 372 million barrels (2024 — reduced from a peak of 695 million after large-scale releases in 2021–2022). Maximum drawdown rate: approximately 4.4 million bbl/day over 90 days. Usage history: Released during the 1991 Gulf War, Hurricane Katrina (2005), Libya crisis (2011), Ukraine war (2022). The Biden administration released approximately 180 million barrels in 2022 — the largest SPR release in history — to combat post-Ukraine invasion oil price spikes. Source: US Department of Energy SPR

India — Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve (ISPRL)

Three underground sites · South India

India established underground strategic petroleum reserves through Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL), a government subsidiary. Three sites cut into underground rock caverns in South India:

Visakhapatnam (Vishakhapatnam) — 17.69°N 83.28°E · Andhra Pradesh · capacity 1.33 million tonnes
Mangalore — 12.87°N 74.85°E · Karnataka · capacity 1.5 million tonnes
Padur — 13.32°N 74.86°E · Karnataka (near Udupi) · capacity 2.5 million tonnes

Total capacity: approximately 5.33 million tonnes (~39 million barrels). India imports approximately 232 million tonnes/year — the ISR represents approximately 9–10 days of supply. India is expanding this: Phase II targets 6.5 million tonnes at Chandikhol (Odisha, 20.72°N 85.99°E) and Padur expansion. The ISR has been used jointly with commercial reserves during the 2022 coordinated IEA/G7 release. Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas India · ISPRL

IEA Emergency Reserves System

31 IEA member countries · Global

The International Energy Agency requires all 31 member countries to hold emergency oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports. These can be held as government-owned strategic reserves (like the US SPR), mandatory commercial stockholding obligations, or a combination. In 2022, the IEA triggered its third ever collective action (the first since the 2011 Libya crisis) — releasing 182 million barrels from member country reserves in coordination after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The release contributed to capping oil price rises. IEA data: combined emergency stockholding of members = approximately 1.5 billion barrels (government stocks) + 2.5 billion barrels (mandatory commercial stocks) = ~4 billion barrels total. Source: IEA Emergency Response System

Other major strategic reserves

China, Japan, South Korea, Germany

China National Petroleum Reserve (CNPR): World's second largest after the US SPR. China has not disclosed exact volumes officially, but independent estimates (IEA, EIA, Bloomberg) suggest approximately 1.0–1.5 billion barrels in eight known strategic reserve sites including Zhoushan (29.98°N 122.21°E), Zhenhai (29.98°N 121.72°E), Daishangang (30.27°N 122.13°E), and Huangdao (36.06°N 120.36°E).

Japan: Approximately 300 million barrels government + 280 million barrels mandatory commercial — among the world's highest per-capita reserves given Japan's total import dependence.

South Korea: Approximately 146 million barrels (97 days of imports).

Source: IEA Emergency Response System · US EIA.

India energy security

India's energy security challenge — the most exposed major economy

India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil — more dependent on imports than any other major economy except Japan. The combination of this import dependency and India's location (all imports must transit Hormuz and/or Malacca) makes energy security a core national priority.

India's oil import geography

India imported approximately 232 million tonnes of crude oil in 2022-23 (PPAC India). Import sources: Iraq (~40 MT, 17%), Saudi Arabia (~36 MT, 16%), Russia (~36 MT in 2023, rising from near zero pre-2022 following Ukraine war price discounts), UAE (~26 MT), USA (~20 MT), Kuwait (~17 MT). India's oil import bill exceeded $160 billion in 2022 — approximately 4% of GDP. The shift to Russian imports post-2022 reduced India's import bill significantly (Russian Urals crude was priced at $25–30/bbl below Brent due to Western sanctions). This was commercially rational for India but created diplomatic tensions with the G7. Source: PPAC India Annual Report 2023.

India's energy security strategy

India's energy security strategy has four components: (1) Supplier diversification — India now imports from 50+ countries to reduce dependence on any single supplier; (2) Strategic reserves — the ISPRL programme (Visakhapatnam, Mangalore, Padur) provides approximately 10 days of emergency cover, with Phase II expansion underway; (3) Domestic production growth — ONGC Mumbai High, Rajasthan Cairn/Vedanta fields, new deepwater exploration; (4) Renewable energy transition — India's 500 GW renewable target by 2030 is fundamentally an energy security policy as much as a climate policy — every kWh from domestic solar or wind is a barrel of imported oil not needed. India also explored the TAPI Pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) as a natural gas diversification route — though the Afghanistan security situation has indefinitely delayed this project. Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas India · MNRE India.

Questions

Questions about energy chokepoints and security

Why can't oil-producing countries just build more pipelines to avoid chokepoints?

Building bypass pipelines is expensive, slow, and requires crossing multiple countries whose cooperation cannot be assumed. The Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline) took years to build and cost billions. The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) to Fujairah similarly took over a decade to plan and build. Together they provide only about 6.5 million bbl/day of bypass capacity out of 21 million through Hormuz. A full bypass pipeline for all Hormuz traffic would need to cross approximately 1,500 km of difficult terrain and deliver oil to an Indian Ocean port — an infrastructure investment exceeding $100 billion. For LNG, pipeline bypass is even harder — Qatar's gas cannot be piped to Europe without crossing Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, each with their own political risks. Pipelines also create their own chokepoints: the Druzhba pipeline was effectively weaponised when Russia cut gas flows to Europe in 2022. Source: US EIA · IEA World Energy Outlook.

Source: US EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints 2024 · IEA Energy Security

How would a Hormuz closure affect India specifically?

A full Hormuz closure would be catastrophic for India. Approximately 85% of India's crude imports transit Hormuz — from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, and increasingly Iran. In 2022-23, India imported approximately 197 million tonnes of crude through Hormuz (of its total 232 MT). India's strategic petroleum reserve of approximately 39 million barrels covers only about 9–10 days of imports. At current consumption (approximately 4.8 million bbl/day), India would begin rationing within two weeks. India's power sector (approximately 25% gas-based) would face gas shortages too. Indian refiners would need to source alternatives from West Africa (Nigeria, Angola), Americas (USA, Brazil), and Russia — but shipping distances would increase significantly, adding cost and time. India's economy, which runs a significant current account deficit, would face massive additional import costs. This existential vulnerability is why India treats the Indo-Pacific shipping lanes and Hormuz security as a core national security issue, participates in Combined Maritime Forces, and maintains an expanding Indian Navy presence in the Arabian Sea. Source: PPAC India · Ministry of External Affairs India · Indian Navy annual report.

Source: PPAC India · MoPNG India · Indian Navy Annual Report 2024

Did the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping actually disrupt energy supply?

Yes, significantly. From October 2023 onwards, Houthi rebels based in Yemen's Houthi-controlled territory launched drone and missile attacks on commercial vessels transiting Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, targeting ships they claimed were linked to Israel or Western countries. By January 2024, most major container shipping lines (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd) and several tanker operators had suspended Red Sea transits and were rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope. The diversion added approximately 7–10 days and $300,000–500,000 per voyage in fuel costs. Suez Canal revenue fell by approximately $7 billion in 2024. LNG freight rates from Qatar to Europe doubled. European gas and power prices rose approximately 10–15% in winter 2024. UK/US/French military operations (Operation Prosperity Guardian) struck Houthi infrastructure but did not stop attacks entirely. India launched INS Visakhapatnam escorts in the Arabian Sea. The episode demonstrated that Bab-el-Mandeb is nearly as critical as Hormuz and much harder to defend against asymmetric threats. Source: US EIA · Lloyd's List · IMO shipping data 2024.

Source: US EIA · Lloyd's List · IMO 2024 shipping disruption reports

Does the energy transition reduce chokepoint risk?

Yes — gradually, but unevenly. The long-term shift from oil and gas to electricity from domestic renewables (solar, wind) directly reduces dependence on imported fossil fuels and the chokepoints they transit. India's 500 GW renewable target by 2030 will reduce its oil import bill once EVs and electric industry become widespread. However, the energy transition creates new supply chain vulnerabilities: solar panels (80%+ made in China), wind turbine rare earth magnets (China), lithium batteries (China, Chile, DRC), and semiconductor chips (Taiwan, South Korea) — all create new geographic concentration risks that may prove harder to diversify than oil supply. The IEA has documented the "clean energy chokepoints" in its Critical Minerals Outlook — the transition replaces oil chokepoints with mineral supply chokepoints. Source: IEA Net Zero by 2050 · IEA Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transitions 2024.

Source: IEA NZE 2050 · IEA Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transitions 2024

How many ships pass through the Strait of Malacca each day?

Approximately 100,000 vessels per year transit the Strait of Malacca — roughly 250–280 ships per day. This makes it one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, second in traffic density only to the English Channel/Dover Strait. Of these, approximately 30–40 per day are oil tankers (totalling approximately 16 million bbl/day), 10–15 are LNG carriers, and the remainder are container ships, bulk carriers, and other vessels. The narrow width (minimum 2.7 km at Phillips Channel) and shallow depth (approximately 25 metres maximum safe draught) means it is also prone to accidents, piracy, and congestion. Port Klang (Malaysia, 2.99°N 101.39°E) and Singapore (1.36°N 103.82°E) at either end are among Asia's busiest ports. Source: Malacca Strait Council · ReCAAP · Singapore MPA shipping statistics 2024.

Source: Malacca Strait Council · Singapore Maritime Port Authority 2024

Provenance

Attribution, confidence level, and citation

Author: The Codex (Let Us Do It For U), Mumbai, India · hello@thecodex.expert
Confidence: High — throughput data from US EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints 2024; reserve data from US DOE and MoPNG India; GPS coordinates from GEM and verified satellite imagery
Cite as: "Energy Security — Chokepoints", The Energy Codex, https://thecodex.expert/energy/security/, last updated 2026-05-03.