Overview
Germany — key energy statistics
~59%
Renewable share of electricity 2023 (Fraunhofer ISE)
0
Nuclear plants — final exit April 2023
81 GW
Solar installed 2024 — 3rd globally per capita
4 FSRUs
Emergency LNG terminals built in 12 months (2022–23)
2045
Target for climate neutrality — 5 yrs ahead of EU
10 GW
Electrolysis target by 2030 — National H₂ Strategy
The Energiewende
Germany's energy transition — what it achieved and what it cost
Energiewende means "energy turnaround" in German. Germany decided in 2011 — immediately after Fukushima — to phase out all nuclear power and build a renewable energy system instead. By 2023, it had 170 GW of wind and solar, renewable electricity exceeded 59%, and the coal share had been halved. The cost was high — over €500 billion invested and some of the highest household electricity prices in Europe. Whether it was worth it depends on what you were trying to achieve.
Achieved by 2024:
Wind capacity: approximately 68 GW (Fraunhofer ISE) — Europe's largest onshore wind fleet. Key offshore: Borkum Riffgrund (53.97°N 6.55°E, 450 MW), Amrumbank West (54.50°N 7.72°E, 300 MW), Global Tech I (54.52°N 7.53°E, 400 MW).
Solar: approximately 81 GW — Germany has more solar per km² than most countries despite its latitude (average GHI only 1,000 kWh/m²/yr). Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg lead.
Coal phase-out: from approximately 45% of power (2013) to approximately 26% (2023). Remaining hard coal plants in North Rhine-Westphalia (Duisburg area 51.43°N 6.76°E). Lignite (brown coal) phased out by 2038 (Rhineland lignite region 50.88°N 6.44°E).
Source: Fraunhofer ISE Energy-Charts.info · Bundesnetzagentur 2024.
Wind capacity: approximately 68 GW (Fraunhofer ISE) — Europe's largest onshore wind fleet. Key offshore: Borkum Riffgrund (53.97°N 6.55°E, 450 MW), Amrumbank West (54.50°N 7.72°E, 300 MW), Global Tech I (54.52°N 7.53°E, 400 MW).
Solar: approximately 81 GW — Germany has more solar per km² than most countries despite its latitude (average GHI only 1,000 kWh/m²/yr). Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg lead.
Coal phase-out: from approximately 45% of power (2013) to approximately 26% (2023). Remaining hard coal plants in North Rhine-Westphalia (Duisburg area 51.43°N 6.76°E). Lignite (brown coal) phased out by 2038 (Rhineland lignite region 50.88°N 6.44°E).
Source: Fraunhofer ISE Energy-Charts.info · Bundesnetzagentur 2024.
The nuclear exit — April 2023:
Germany shut its last three nuclear power stations on : Isar 2 (48.61°N 12.30°E, Bavaria, 1,485 MW), Emsland (52.47°N 7.32°E, Lower Saxony, 1,290 MW), and Neckarwestheim 2 (49.03°N 9.17°E, Baden-Württemberg, 1,310 MW). These were among Europe's most efficient and safest nuclear plants — and their closure removed approximately 4,500 MW of firm, dispatchable, low-carbon electricity. The decision was made in 2011 immediately after Fukushima — and remained politically irreversible despite the 2022 energy crisis (a brief extension to April 2023 was granted). Critics including Nobel laureate energy economists argued the plants should be kept running during the gas crisis. The government maintained the decision. Germany now imports nuclear electricity from France — paying French nuclear power while having closed its own. Source: Bundestag energy committee records · DIW Berlin nuclear analysis 2023.
Germany shut its last three nuclear power stations on : Isar 2 (48.61°N 12.30°E, Bavaria, 1,485 MW), Emsland (52.47°N 7.32°E, Lower Saxony, 1,290 MW), and Neckarwestheim 2 (49.03°N 9.17°E, Baden-Württemberg, 1,310 MW). These were among Europe's most efficient and safest nuclear plants — and their closure removed approximately 4,500 MW of firm, dispatchable, low-carbon electricity. The decision was made in 2011 immediately after Fukushima — and remained politically irreversible despite the 2022 energy crisis (a brief extension to April 2023 was granted). Critics including Nobel laureate energy economists argued the plants should be kept running during the gas crisis. The government maintained the decision. Germany now imports nuclear electricity from France — paying French nuclear power while having closed its own. Source: Bundestag energy committee records · DIW Berlin nuclear analysis 2023.
The 2022 energy crisis
How Germany reversed 15 years of energy policy in 12 months
From 55% Russian gas to <5% in two years:
Before February 2022, Germany received approximately 55% of its natural gas from Russia via Nord Stream 1 (Lubmin landfall, 54.14°N 13.62°E) and the Ukrainian transit network. Gas was central to Germany's industrial economy — BASF Ludwigshafen (49.48°N 8.44°E), the world's largest integrated chemical complex, uses enormous volumes of gas for chemical feedstocks and process heat. When Russia cut flows and Nord Stream was destroyed, Germany faced potential deindustrialisation. The response was faster than almost anyone expected: (1) Four FSRUs commissioned in under 12 months — Wilhelmshaven Neptune (53.52°N 8.15°E, operational December 2022 — Germany's first ever LNG import terminal, operational in months rather than the years a land-based terminal requires), Brunsbüttel Deutsche ReGas (53.90°N 9.23°E), Lubmin2 Deutsche Energy Terminal (54.14°N 13.62°E), Elbehafen (53.95°N 9.18°E). (2) Norwegian gas imports maximised — Norway replaced Russia as Germany's largest single gas supplier. (3) LNG from USA, Qatar, and other sources filled the gap. (4) Gas consumption fell approximately 14% in 2022–23 through mandatory efficiency and behavioral change. By end-2023, Germany's gas storage was at 99% capacity and Russian gas dependence had fallen below 5%. Source: IEA Gas Market Report 2024 · Bundesnetzagentur Gas Security reports 2022–23.
Before February 2022, Germany received approximately 55% of its natural gas from Russia via Nord Stream 1 (Lubmin landfall, 54.14°N 13.62°E) and the Ukrainian transit network. Gas was central to Germany's industrial economy — BASF Ludwigshafen (49.48°N 8.44°E), the world's largest integrated chemical complex, uses enormous volumes of gas for chemical feedstocks and process heat. When Russia cut flows and Nord Stream was destroyed, Germany faced potential deindustrialisation. The response was faster than almost anyone expected: (1) Four FSRUs commissioned in under 12 months — Wilhelmshaven Neptune (53.52°N 8.15°E, operational December 2022 — Germany's first ever LNG import terminal, operational in months rather than the years a land-based terminal requires), Brunsbüttel Deutsche ReGas (53.90°N 9.23°E), Lubmin2 Deutsche Energy Terminal (54.14°N 13.62°E), Elbehafen (53.95°N 9.18°E). (2) Norwegian gas imports maximised — Norway replaced Russia as Germany's largest single gas supplier. (3) LNG from USA, Qatar, and other sources filled the gap. (4) Gas consumption fell approximately 14% in 2022–23 through mandatory efficiency and behavioral change. By end-2023, Germany's gas storage was at 99% capacity and Russian gas dependence had fallen below 5%. Source: IEA Gas Market Report 2024 · Bundesnetzagentur Gas Security reports 2022–23.
Industrial decarbonisation
Germany's industrial challenge — steel, chemicals, and the hydrogen bet
ThyssenKrupp hydrogen steel (Duisburg):
ThyssenKrupp Steel at Duisburg (51.49°N 6.82°E) operates Europe's largest integrated steel complex. Conventional steelmaking uses coking coal in blast furnaces. ThyssenKrupp's tkH2Steel project aims to replace blast furnaces with direct reduction of iron (DRI) using green hydrogen — producing "green steel" with near-zero CO₂. The first DRI shaft (100,000 tonnes/yr capacity) was inaugurated in 2024. Full transition to hydrogen steel by 2030 requires approximately 143,000 tonnes/yr of green hydrogen — which requires approximately 720 MW of dedicated electrolysers. Germany's National Hydrogen Strategy plans a dedicated pipeline network (H2 Backbone) of 9,700 km of repurposed natural gas pipelines by 2037. Steel is approximately 7–8% of Germany's industrial CO₂ — green hydrogen steel is the most capital-intensive single decarbonisation project in Germany. Source: ThyssenKrupp Steel Annual Report 2023.
ThyssenKrupp Steel at Duisburg (51.49°N 6.82°E) operates Europe's largest integrated steel complex. Conventional steelmaking uses coking coal in blast furnaces. ThyssenKrupp's tkH2Steel project aims to replace blast furnaces with direct reduction of iron (DRI) using green hydrogen — producing "green steel" with near-zero CO₂. The first DRI shaft (100,000 tonnes/yr capacity) was inaugurated in 2024. Full transition to hydrogen steel by 2030 requires approximately 143,000 tonnes/yr of green hydrogen — which requires approximately 720 MW of dedicated electrolysers. Germany's National Hydrogen Strategy plans a dedicated pipeline network (H2 Backbone) of 9,700 km of repurposed natural gas pipelines by 2037. Steel is approximately 7–8% of Germany's industrial CO₂ — green hydrogen steel is the most capital-intensive single decarbonisation project in Germany. Source: ThyssenKrupp Steel Annual Report 2023.
BASF and the chemical industry challenge:
BASF Ludwigshafen (49.48°N 8.44°E) is the world's largest integrated chemical complex — a single site with 200+ production plants, 33,000 employees, and a private railway network. It uses approximately 3.4 TWh/yr of electricity and enormous volumes of natural gas (steam cracking, process heat, hydrogen production via SMR). BASF's response to the 2022 energy crisis was one of the most visible in Europe — the company announced it would "permanently" downsize Ludwigshafen due to structurally high European energy costs, shifting investment to China (Zhanjiang, 20.92°N 110.36°E) and the USA (Geismar, Louisiana). This was a profound moment: Germany's most important chemical company stating that the energy transition had made European manufacturing uncompetitive. The Inflation Reduction Act in the USA accelerated this trend. BASF invested €10 billion in Zhanjiang China, co-located with cheap renewable energy. Source: BASF Annual Report 2023 · BASF management conference statements 2022–2023.
BASF Ludwigshafen (49.48°N 8.44°E) is the world's largest integrated chemical complex — a single site with 200+ production plants, 33,000 employees, and a private railway network. It uses approximately 3.4 TWh/yr of electricity and enormous volumes of natural gas (steam cracking, process heat, hydrogen production via SMR). BASF's response to the 2022 energy crisis was one of the most visible in Europe — the company announced it would "permanently" downsize Ludwigshafen due to structurally high European energy costs, shifting investment to China (Zhanjiang, 20.92°N 110.36°E) and the USA (Geismar, Louisiana). This was a profound moment: Germany's most important chemical company stating that the energy transition had made European manufacturing uncompetitive. The Inflation Reduction Act in the USA accelerated this trend. BASF invested €10 billion in Zhanjiang China, co-located with cheap renewable energy. Source: BASF Annual Report 2023 · BASF management conference statements 2022–2023.
Questions
Questions about Germany's energy transition
Has the Energiewende worked? Did Germany decarbonise successfully?
The honest answer is: partially yes, but with important failures and unexpected costs. What worked: Germany proved that a large, complex, industrial economy can get more than 50% of its electricity from renewables — demolishing the argument that renewables are only for sunny or sparsely populated countries. 81 GW of solar and 68 GW of wind were installed. Coal's share of power fell from approximately 45% (2013) to approximately 26% (2023). Power sector CO₂ emissions fell approximately 40% from 2013 to 2023. The cost of solar and wind globally fell dramatically partly because Germany's early adoption created scale. What failed: Closing nuclear simultaneously with building renewables required more gas backup — slowing CO₂ reduction. Germany's total CO₂ emissions fell more slowly than comparable economies that kept nuclear (France). Household electricity prices became among Europe's highest (~€0.35/kWh in 2022 vs €0.18 EU average). The 2022 energy crisis revealed that 20 years of energy policy had created a structural vulnerability to Russian gas. Industrial competitiveness was damaged — BASF, steel, and chemical industries all cited energy costs in relocation decisions. Net verdict: The Energiewende built the world's most capable renewables infrastructure in a temperate country. Its sequencing (nuclear before coal) was a significant strategic error. Its vulnerability to geopolitical disruption was not adequately managed. It is a lesson in both ambition and the importance of transition sequencing. Source: Agora Energiewende Energiewende Review 2024 · DIW Berlin Energiewende assessment · IEA Germany 2024.
Why does Germany have some of Europe's highest electricity prices?
Germany's household electricity price (~€0.30–0.38/kWh in 2023–24, Eurostat) is among Europe's highest, despite having abundant cheap renewable generation. The apparent paradox has several explanations: (1) Grid charges and taxes: The actual market price for electricity in Germany is often among Europe's lowest — on sunny, windy days the wholesale price goes negative. But retail prices include: network charges (Netzentgelte, ~€0.08/kWh) for grid operation and maintenance of a massive, complex grid balancing renewables; the renewable energy surcharge (EEG-Umlage, reduced to zero from government subsidies from 2023); VAT; concession fees; electricity taxes. These non-energy charges now account for more than half of the retail price. (2) Grid investment: Germany needs approximately €600 billion of grid investment to connect North Sea offshore wind to South Germany's industrial centres via HVDC lines — costs that will ultimately be passed to consumers. (3) Backup capacity: Firm gas and coal plants must be kept available for dark-calm (Dunkelflaute) periods when wind and solar produce little for days at a time. Their cost recovery must come from the market even when they run few hours. (4) Social policy: Germany has kept subsidised electricity for heavy industry (Industrieprivileg) to maintain competitiveness — meaning households and small businesses cross-subsidise industry. Source: Bundesnetzagentur Electricity Market Report 2024 · Eurostat electricity prices · Agora Energiewende.
What is Dunkelflaute and why does it challenge Germany's all-renewable ambition?
Dunkelflaute (literally "dark doldrums" in German) refers to extended periods — typically in winter — when Germany has both low solar irradiance (short days, cloud cover) and low wind speeds simultaneously. During these periods, Germany's combined solar and wind output can fall to as low as 5–10 GW against a demand of 60–70 GW — a gap that must be filled entirely by dispatchable generation (gas, coal, hydro imports). In , Germany experienced a Dunkelflaute of approximately 10 days where renewable output was below 15 GW for extended periods. The country ran its remaining coal and gas plants at full capacity and imported electricity from France's nuclear fleet and Scandinavian hydro. This event is central to the energy policy debate: (1) How much firm backup capacity is needed for a 80–100% renewable grid? (2) What is the cost of that backup capacity which runs very few hours per year? (3) Can long-duration storage (iron-air batteries, hydrogen cavern storage) economically replace firm backup? The physics of Dunkelflaute in Central Europe's climate means approximately 1–2 weeks of very low combined renewable output must be planned for in a robust system design. This is why Germany's energy policy includes gas-to-hydrogen "ready" power plants — new gas plants designed to eventually switch to green hydrogen when it becomes available. Source: Fraunhofer ISE Energy-Charts.info · ENTSO-E adequacy assessment · German Federal Network Agency Winter Adequacy Report 2024.
Provenance
Attribution and citation
- Sources
- Fraunhofer ISE Energy-Charts.info 2024 · Bundesnetzagentur Annual Report 2024 · IEA Germany 2024 · Agora Energiewende Annual Review 2024 · BASF Annual Report 2023 · ThyssenKrupp Annual Report 2023
- Cite as
- "Germany Energy Profile", The Energy Codex, https://thecodex.expert/energy/countries/germany/, last updated .