Overview
Russia — key energy statistics
10.9 M bbl/day
Oil production — 3rd globally (IEA 2023)
~175,000 km
Gazprom gas pipeline network
16.5 MTPA
Yamal LNG (73.50°N 67.50°E)
−80%
Gas exports to Europe post-2022
37 reactors
Nuclear capacity — Rosatom
Kuzbass
240 MT/yr coal — Siberia
Oil and gas infrastructure · GPS-located
Russia's energy geography — from Arctic fields to European pipelines
Russia has the world's largest proven natural gas reserves and the third-largest oil production. Its energy revenues funded its government and its military — understanding Russian energy geography is essential to understanding the 2022 Ukraine crisis and its aftermath.
| Facility / Field | GPS | Scale | Operator | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| West Siberia Oil Region | 61.00°N 69.00°E | ~6 M bbl/day | Rosneft, Lukoil, others | Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug. Samotlor field (60.85°N 76.60°E, 28 Gbbls, once 3.4M bbl/day now ~270,000) — Soviet-era giant, heavily depleted. Newer fields: Vankor (67.88°N 83.84°E, 400,000 bbl/day, Rosneft). West Siberia produces approximately 60% of all Russian crude. |
| Primorsk Export Terminal | 60.37°N 28.75°E | ~60 MT/yr crude export | Transneft | Baltic Sea, Gulf of Finland. Russia's largest crude oil export terminal — hub of the Druzhba pipeline system's Baltic branch. Aframax tankers load here for European (pre-2022) and now Asian/Indian destinations via the Bosphorus and Cape routes. |
| Ust-Luga Terminal | 59.78°N 28.56°E | ~30 MT/yr crude | Transneft | Baltic Sea. Newer terminal opened 2012. Also handles refined products and coal. Became strategically important post-2022 as Russia needed to route exports away from Primorsk's visibility to EU-monitored shipping lanes. |
| Novorossiysk (CPC Terminal) | 44.73°N 37.77°E | ~35 MT/yr crude | Caspian Pipeline Consortium | Black Sea. Carries Kazakhstani Tengiz crude (also Russian) via the CPC pipeline from Kazakhstan. Subject to Turkey's Bosphorus transit rules — Turkey briefly disrupted flows in 2022 citing insurance documentation, demonstrating the chokepoint risk. |
| Yamal LNG | 73.50°N 67.50°E | 16.5 MTPA | Novatek (50.1%), TotalEnergies (20%), CNPC (20%), Silk Road Fund (9.9%) | Sabetta Port, Yamal Peninsula, Arctic. Three trains operational. Uses Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers designed to navigate Arctic ice independently — enabling year-round Northern Sea Route shipments to Asia. Fourth train (Arctic LNG 2, 19.8 MTPA) was partially sanctioned post-2022, delaying completion. Gas comes from the South Tambey field — one of the world's largest undeveloped gas fields. |
| Power of Siberia Pipeline | 51.75°N 119.31°E | 38 bcm/yr (growing to 50) | Gazprom (Russia) → CNPC (China) | Eastern Siberia-China gas pipeline. Launched December 2019. Runs from Kovyktinskoye (57.60°N 105.00°E) and Chayandinskoye (60.28°N 121.42°E) gas fields in Eastern Siberia to China's northeast. Russia's strategic pivot to Asia — reduces dependence on European gas market. Power of Siberia 2 (planned, 50 bcm/yr via Mongolia to China) under negotiation. |
| TurkStream Pipeline | 41.00°N 28.00°E | 31.5 bcm/yr | Gazprom + BOTAS (Turkey) | Black Sea seabed pipeline from Anapa Russia (45.00°N 37.32°E) to Kiyikoy Turkey (41.37°N 27.94°E). Two strings: one for Turkey's domestic market, one for Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary). Became critical post-2022 as the only remaining Russian gas route to Europe after Nord Stream destruction. Turkey became Russia's gas transit hub to Europe. |
| Prirazlomnaya Arctic Platform | 69.23°N 57.34°E | ~80,000 bbl/day | Gazprom Neft | Pechora Sea, Russian Arctic — world's first ice-resistant fixed oil platform in Arctic offshore waters. Produces Arco (Arctic Oil) crude. Operational since 2013. Target of Greenpeace protest in 2013 — activists boarded it, were arrested and briefly charged with piracy. Symbol of Russia's Arctic energy ambitions. |
The 2022 rupture
How Russia weaponised energy — and what happened
The build-up (2021–2022):
Before February 2022, Russia supplied approximately 40% of EU natural gas, 27% of EU oil imports, and 46% of EU coal imports. This dependence was built deliberately over decades — Soviet-era pipelines were reinforced by cheap gas contracts, and European industry was restructured around cheap Russian energy. Germany in particular built its Energiewende partly on the assumption of cheap Russian gas as backup for intermittent renewables. Russia began reducing gas supplies to Europe in mid-2021 — before the invasion — by declining to book additional transit capacity through Ukraine and not restoring Gazprom's below-average European gas storage holdings. Winter 2021–2022 saw gas prices at record levels even before tanks crossed the border.
Before February 2022, Russia supplied approximately 40% of EU natural gas, 27% of EU oil imports, and 46% of EU coal imports. This dependence was built deliberately over decades — Soviet-era pipelines were reinforced by cheap gas contracts, and European industry was restructured around cheap Russian energy. Germany in particular built its Energiewende partly on the assumption of cheap Russian gas as backup for intermittent renewables. Russia began reducing gas supplies to Europe in mid-2021 — before the invasion — by declining to book additional transit capacity through Ukraine and not restoring Gazprom's below-average European gas storage holdings. Winter 2021–2022 saw gas prices at record levels even before tanks crossed the border.
The rupture and response:
After February 2022, Russia progressively cut gas to Europe — first to countries that refused to pay in roubles (Poland, Bulgaria, Finland), then to Germany via reduced Nord Stream 1 flows. Nord Stream 1 and 2 were destroyed by underwater explosions on 26 September 2022 (55.53°N 15.56°E, Baltic Sea, near Bornholm Island, Denmark). Investigations by Germany, Sweden, and Denmark were inconclusive — officially. The destruction permanently ended any prospect of Russian gas to Germany via the Baltic. Europe's response: emergency diversification to US and Qatari LNG (new FSRUs deployed in under 12 months), Norwegian gas increase, demand reduction (−15% across the EU, 2022–23), accelerated renewables. EU gas storage reached 95% by October 2023 without Russian volumes. European dependence on Russian gas fell from 40% to approximately 8% by end-2023. Source: IEA Russia Special Report 2022 · European Commission REPowerEU.
After February 2022, Russia progressively cut gas to Europe — first to countries that refused to pay in roubles (Poland, Bulgaria, Finland), then to Germany via reduced Nord Stream 1 flows. Nord Stream 1 and 2 were destroyed by underwater explosions on 26 September 2022 (55.53°N 15.56°E, Baltic Sea, near Bornholm Island, Denmark). Investigations by Germany, Sweden, and Denmark were inconclusive — officially. The destruction permanently ended any prospect of Russian gas to Germany via the Baltic. Europe's response: emergency diversification to US and Qatari LNG (new FSRUs deployed in under 12 months), Norwegian gas increase, demand reduction (−15% across the EU, 2022–23), accelerated renewables. EU gas storage reached 95% by October 2023 without Russian volumes. European dependence on Russian gas fell from 40% to approximately 8% by end-2023. Source: IEA Russia Special Report 2022 · European Commission REPowerEU.
Asia pivot and shadow fleet
Russia's energy pivot east — India, China, and the shadow fleet
Rerouting 3.5 million bbl/day:
Russia's oil export revenues depend on finding buyers. When Western nations banned Russian crude or imposed the G7 price cap ($60/bbl), Russia redirected exports to India, China, and Turkey. The logistics required a "shadow fleet" — approximately 600–700 tankers (older vessels, many owned via opaque structures in UAE, Hong Kong, or unknown jurisdictions) that carry Russian crude using non-Western insurance (not Lloyd's P&I Club) and non-Western flag states. These vessels typically load at Primorsk (60.37°N 28.75°E), Ust-Luga (59.78°N 28.56°E), Kozmino (42.76°N 133.08°E), or Novorossiysk (44.73°N 37.77°E) and deliver to Vadinar India (22.47°N 69.87°E), Chinese ports, or Ceyhan Turkey (36.65°N 35.77°E). Russia's oil export revenues remained substantial despite the price cap — Russia sold at approximately $60–70/bbl (just under the cap) to Asia while the Brent benchmark was $80–90/bbl. The shadow fleet enabled Russia to maintain oil revenue at approximately $130–150 billion/year — reduced but not eliminated. Source: IEA Oil Market Report 2024 · Kpler shipping intelligence · US Treasury OFAC reports on shadow fleet.
Russia's oil export revenues depend on finding buyers. When Western nations banned Russian crude or imposed the G7 price cap ($60/bbl), Russia redirected exports to India, China, and Turkey. The logistics required a "shadow fleet" — approximately 600–700 tankers (older vessels, many owned via opaque structures in UAE, Hong Kong, or unknown jurisdictions) that carry Russian crude using non-Western insurance (not Lloyd's P&I Club) and non-Western flag states. These vessels typically load at Primorsk (60.37°N 28.75°E), Ust-Luga (59.78°N 28.56°E), Kozmino (42.76°N 133.08°E), or Novorossiysk (44.73°N 37.77°E) and deliver to Vadinar India (22.47°N 69.87°E), Chinese ports, or Ceyhan Turkey (36.65°N 35.77°E). Russia's oil export revenues remained substantial despite the price cap — Russia sold at approximately $60–70/bbl (just under the cap) to Asia while the Brent benchmark was $80–90/bbl. The shadow fleet enabled Russia to maintain oil revenue at approximately $130–150 billion/year — reduced but not eliminated. Source: IEA Oil Market Report 2024 · Kpler shipping intelligence · US Treasury OFAC reports on shadow fleet.
Russia energy future
What happens to Russia's energy sector long-term
Russia faces a difficult future: Western technology and investment are gone (BP, Shell, ExxonMobil all exited in 2022), maintenance of complex oil fields will become harder without Western equipment, and oil demand globally is expected to eventually decline. Russia's pivot to China creates a new dependency — but on a single large buyer that has significant pricing power.
Questions
Questions about Russia's energy
Who blew up Nord Stream — and does it matter for energy?
The Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines were damaged by underwater explosions on 26 September 2022 near Bornholm Island, Denmark (55.53°N 15.56°E). Three of the four pipeline strings were permanently destroyed. Germany, Sweden, and Denmark opened investigations — Sweden and Denmark later closed theirs without publicly naming a perpetrator. German prosecutors investigated and reportedly identified Ukrainian nationals with access to a yacht as the likely perpetrators, though Ukrainian government involvement was not established. Russia blamed the USA and UK; the USA denied involvement. The full truth remains officially unresolved as of 2024. For energy: the immediate impact was limited because Russia had already cut flows to near-zero before the explosion. The longer-term impact is that any future Russia-Germany gas reconciliation — however unlikely politically — is physically impossible without entirely new pipeline infrastructure. Nord Stream represented approximately €10–11 billion of investment, destroyed in minutes. It confirmed that energy infrastructure is a legitimate target of hybrid warfare, transforming how European grid operators think about infrastructure resilience and redundancy. Source: German Federal Prosecutor's Office reports · IEA Russia analysis · Spiegel/Zeit investigative reporting 2023–2024.
Has the G7 price cap on Russian oil actually worked?
The G7 price cap ($60/bbl for Russian crude, implemented December 2022) has achieved partial but not complete success. The mechanism: Western shipping services (insurance, tankers, brokers) are prohibited from facilitating Russian crude trades above $60/bbl. Since Western P&I Clubs insure approximately 90% of global tanker capacity, this theoretically restricts Russia's ability to sell oil above the cap. In practice: (1) The shadow fleet of approximately 600–700 non-Western-insured tankers has grown enormously, carrying approximately 60–70% of Russian crude exports outside Western insurance jurisdiction. (2) Russian crude prices stayed close to $60/bbl in 2023–2024 — not far below the cap — suggesting some effectiveness in capping revenue but not eliminating it. (3) India and China have largely ignored the cap, buying Russian oil at whatever price makes commercial sense. (4) US OFAC has sanctioned specific shadow fleet vessels and operators — periodically disrupting but not stopping flows. The IMF estimated the cap reduced Russian oil revenues by approximately $30 billion in 2023 vs a no-cap scenario. Given that Russia earned approximately $150 billion in oil revenues in 2023, the cap has reduced but not crippled Russian energy earnings. Source: US Treasury OFAC · IEA Oil Market Report 2024 · CREA Russia Fossil Fuel Revenues tracker.
What is Yamal LNG and why does it operate in the Arctic?
Yamal LNG (73.50°N 67.50°E) is a 16.5 MTPA LNG export facility on the Yamal Peninsula in Russia's High Arctic — one of the world's most extreme industrial environments. It was built there because the South Tambey gas field beneath the peninsula contains approximately 926 billion cubic metres of proven gas reserves — one of the world's largest undeveloped gas deposits when discovered. The Arctic setting creates unique logistics challenges: sea ice covers the area 9 months per year. The solution: 15 Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers (built at South Korean DSME and Russian Zvezda shipyards) capable of independently navigating 2-metre-thick ice without an icebreaker. In summer, tankers transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to Asia — cutting the journey from Yamal to Japan from 30 days via Suez to 18 days. In winter, European-bound tankers transit west normally. Arctic LNG 2 (Novatek's follow-on project, 19.8 MTPA) was partially sanctioned after 2022 — TotalEnergies froze its investment, and the project has faced completion delays. Yamal LNG itself has continued operating because it was fully operational before sanctions. The facility demonstrates that Arctic energy can be technically viable — but its economics require $50–70/bbl oil equivalent gas prices, and its future depends on ice-free Arctic summers (climate change is paradoxically making Arctic extraction easier even as it reduces the planet's ability to absorb emissions). Source: Novatek Annual Report 2023 · IEA Arctic Energy Report · AMAP Arctic Monitoring.
Provenance
Attribution and citation
- Sources
- IEA Russia Special Report 2022 · IEA Oil Market Report 2024 · BP Statistical Review 2024 · Gazprom Annual Report 2023 · Novatek Annual Report 2023 · Rosneft Annual Report 2023 · Kpler shipping intelligence · CREA Russia Fossil Fuel Revenue Tracker
- Cite as
- "Russia Energy Profile", The Energy Codex, https://thecodex.expert/energy/countries/russia/, last updated .