Asset specification
Vogtle Units 3 & 4 — key facts
Georgia Power AR 2023 · NRC license records · Southern Company
GPS coordinates
33.14°N
81.76°W
81.76°W
Units 3+4 capacity
2 × 1,117 MW (AP1000)
Total site capacity
4,664 MW (all 4 units)
Unit 3 commercial op.
June 2023
Unit 4 commercial op.
Nov 2024
Final cost
~$35 B ($14B original)
Delay
7+ years over schedule
Reactor design
AP1000
Westinghouse
Westinghouse
Safety system
Passive
no power needed
no power needed
Owner (lead)
Georgia Power
(Southern Co.)
(Southern Co.)
The AP1000 design
Passive safety — why AP1000 is different from all previous reactors
What passive safety means:
Conventional nuclear reactors (PWRs, BWRs, VVERs) rely on active safety systems — pumps, valves, and power supplies that must work correctly during an accident to cool the reactor. When Fukushima's tsunami knocked out backup diesel generators, the active cooling systems failed — causing meltdown. The AP1000 eliminates this dependency: its core cooling system uses only gravity, natural convection, and compressed gas stored in tanks. In a design-basis accident: (1) Core makeup tanks gravity-drain water into the reactor core. (2) A large water tank (IRWST — In-containment Refuelling Water Storage Tank) above the reactor provides 72+ hours of passive cooling. (3) Outside air flows passively over the steel containment vessel, cooling it by natural convection and evaporation. No pumps, no power, no operator action required for 72 hours. Westinghouse estimates the AP1000 is 100× less likely to have core damage than a conventional PWR. Source: Westinghouse AP1000 Design Control Document · NRC review records.
Conventional nuclear reactors (PWRs, BWRs, VVERs) rely on active safety systems — pumps, valves, and power supplies that must work correctly during an accident to cool the reactor. When Fukushima's tsunami knocked out backup diesel generators, the active cooling systems failed — causing meltdown. The AP1000 eliminates this dependency: its core cooling system uses only gravity, natural convection, and compressed gas stored in tanks. In a design-basis accident: (1) Core makeup tanks gravity-drain water into the reactor core. (2) A large water tank (IRWST — In-containment Refuelling Water Storage Tank) above the reactor provides 72+ hours of passive cooling. (3) Outside air flows passively over the steel containment vessel, cooling it by natural convection and evaporation. No pumps, no power, no operator action required for 72 hours. Westinghouse estimates the AP1000 is 100× less likely to have core damage than a conventional PWR. Source: Westinghouse AP1000 Design Control Document · NRC review records.
The construction disaster — and what it means for nuclear economics:
Vogtle Units 3+4 began construction in 2013 with a $14 billion budget. The project was catastrophically mismanaged: (1) The EPC contractor was CB&I Stone & Webster — which had never built a nuclear plant before. They underestimated the complexity. (2) Westinghouse had never built the AP1000 before — it existed only on paper as a licensed design. (3) The USA's nuclear construction workforce had atrophied after 30 years of no new builds — skilled trades workers, quality inspectors, and nuclear-grade suppliers had to be reconstructed. (4) Rework was constant — thousands of welds were redone. (5) Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2017 — restructured as a Brookfield Asset Management subsidiary. Final cost: approximately $35 billion. Despite this catastrophe, the plants now exist and will generate approximately 10% of Georgia's electricity for 60+ years. The economics: at $35 billion for 2,234 MW, the capital cost per kW is approximately $15,600/kW — far above wind or solar. But with 90%+ capacity factors and 60-year lifetimes, the LCOE works out to approximately $90–120/MWh. Source: DOE Vogtle project review · Southern Company AR 2023 · MIT Energy Initiative nuclear economics study.
Vogtle Units 3+4 began construction in 2013 with a $14 billion budget. The project was catastrophically mismanaged: (1) The EPC contractor was CB&I Stone & Webster — which had never built a nuclear plant before. They underestimated the complexity. (2) Westinghouse had never built the AP1000 before — it existed only on paper as a licensed design. (3) The USA's nuclear construction workforce had atrophied after 30 years of no new builds — skilled trades workers, quality inspectors, and nuclear-grade suppliers had to be reconstructed. (4) Rework was constant — thousands of welds were redone. (5) Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2017 — restructured as a Brookfield Asset Management subsidiary. Final cost: approximately $35 billion. Despite this catastrophe, the plants now exist and will generate approximately 10% of Georgia's electricity for 60+ years. The economics: at $35 billion for 2,234 MW, the capital cost per kW is approximately $15,600/kW — far above wind or solar. But with 90%+ capacity factors and 60-year lifetimes, the LCOE works out to approximately $90–120/MWh. Source: DOE Vogtle project review · Southern Company AR 2023 · MIT Energy Initiative nuclear economics study.
Questions
Questions about Vogtle
Was it worth building Vogtle given the massive cost overruns?
This is one of the most contested questions in US energy policy. Arguments that it was worth it: (1) Once built, Vogtle generates 2,234 MW of zero-carbon, firm (dispatchable 24/7) electricity for 60+ years. No weather dependency, no storage needed. Georgia's electricity will be approximately 30% nuclear post-Vogtle. (2) The first-of-a-kind (FOAK) cost penalty for any technology is always high — steam power, natural gas combined cycle, and the first solar and wind farms all had high FOAK costs before learning curves drove costs down. If the USA builds more AP1000s, nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) costs should be lower. China's AP1000s (Sanmen 28.97°N 121.61°E, Haiyang 37.00°N 121.26°E) were completed significantly faster and cheaper than Vogtle because China had an active nuclear construction workforce. (3) Completing Vogtle preserved and rebuilt US nuclear construction skills — workforce, supply chain, regulatory procedures — that had deteriorated over 30 years. (4) IEA NZE 2050 requires nuclear to grow to 812 GW globally by 2050 from 395 GW today — Vogtle demonstrates the USA can still commission new plants. Arguments against: (1) At $15,600/kW, Vogtle is the most expensive electricity generation asset built in US history per kW. The same $35 billion could have built approximately 25–30 GW of solar + storage. (2) Georgia ratepayers bore most of the risk — Georgia Power's parent Southern Company was protected by the Vogtle Construction Monitoring process, which allowed cost recovery. (3) The overruns were foreseeable — multiple warnings from nuclear economists were issued and ignored. Net: Vogtle was worth building for the electricity, the skills, and the precedent. The business model (single owner, fixed-price EPC with unknown contractor) was not worth repeating. Future US nuclear — if it happens — will likely be smaller (SMRs), modular, and factory-built to avoid the Vogtle trap. Source: DOE Vogtle report · MIT Energy Initiative · Nuclear Energy Institute.
Provenance
Attribution and citation
- Sources
- Georgia Power Annual Report 2023 · Southern Company Annual Report 2023 · NRC Vogtle Combined License (COL) records · Westinghouse AP1000 DCD · DOE Vogtle project cost review 2023
- Cite as
- "Vogtle Nuclear Plant — First New US Nuclear in 30 Years", The Energy Codex, https://thecodex.expert/energy/nuclear/plants/vogtle/, last updated .